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1.  Introduction
In Book Four of Plato's Republic, Socrates divides the soul.   He argues that 1
because one thing cannot do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in the same 
relation, and at the same time, some cases of psychological conflict can only be 
explained by supposing that the soul is actually more than one thing.  But Socrates 
does not deny that the soul is a unity.  Rather, he holds that the soul, like so many 
entities, is both a many and a one.  He refers to the divisions as parts of the soul,  and 2
even when he ascribes actions and attitudes to a part of the soul, he also ascribes them 
to the whole soul (esp. 439a-b, 439d).  Although few souls enjoy the unity that virtue 
earns,  every human soul possesses an unearned unity.   3 4
I thank the organizers of the Toronto conference and the editors for including me.  I also thank 
Jennifer Whiting for the paper on which I commented in Toronto and Devin Henry for the 
opportunity to present a successor to those comments at the University of Western Ontario.  Finally, 
I thank those who offered helpful comments on the successor, especially Verity Harte and John 
Mouracade in Ontario, and Clerk Shaw, Rachel Singpurwalla, Eric Wiland, and the editors by 
correspondence. 
  For the Republic, I cite the text of Slings 2003, and translations are mine, though I have 1
borrowed heavily from Grube's translation, as revised by Reeve, which appears in Cooper 1997.
  Socrates calls the divisions εἴδη, γένη, and μέρη: εἴδη in 435c1, 435c5, 435e1, 439e1, γένη in 2
441c6, 443d3, μέρη in 442b10, 442c4, 444b3 (cf. 577d4, 581a6, 583a1, 586e5).  He also refers to 
the whole soul in 436b2 (cf. σύνθετον at 611b5-7).
  For earned unity, see especially 443d-e.  That it is rare follows from these three points: virtue 3
requires knowledge (442c), knowledge requires philosophy (474b-480a), and philosophy is rare 
(491a-b).   
  I discuss an apparent exception (554d) in the last section. 4
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What explains this unearned unity?  How do reason, spirit, and appetite 
constitute a single whole?  This question has received little attention.   My first aim here 5
is to establish that it is an important puzzle, and my second is to venture an answer. 
2.  The importance of the soul's unity
My question is in part mereological.  Plato assumes that my reason, spirit, and 
appetite constitute a complex unity, and that my reason, spirit, and appetite together 
with your spirit do not.  What explains which psychological elements constitute a whole 
soul and which do not?
The interest of my question, however, is not exclusively mereological, and 
Socrates' talk of "parts" and "wholes" does not exhaust the reasons for asking it.  Plato 
needs to explain the unearned unity of the soul.  First, if the soul is, for all that he can 
explain, three distinct entities, then he cannot account for the felt unity of 
consciousness.   As Descartes puts it, "When I consider the mind, or myself insofar as I 6
am merely a thinking thing, I am unable to distinguish any parts within myself; I 
understand myself to be something quite single and complete."   In the Republic, 7
Socrates does not address this unity of consciousness directly, but he assumes that a 
human agent is somehow aware of what every part of his or her soul thinks and feels.  
Unless the human agent is something over and beyond the parts, it is somehow 
composed of the parts.  How?  
Second, if Plato cannot explain the unity of the soul, then he cannot treat the 
whole soul as the locus of moral responsibility.  Socrates speaks as though our ordinary 
practices of praise and blame correctly take the same agent to be responsible whether 
he pursues wisdom, reacts angrily, or seeks a yummy dinner (cf. 436a8-b4, quoted 
  But see Aristotle De an. I 5 411b5-7, Archer-Hind 1882, 124, and Lorenz 2006, 38-40.  Some 5
scholars offer a principled excuse: they maintain that the soul is a simple unity with three 
different kinds of psychological states and activities that are mere conceptual parts (e.g., Shields 
2001).  I argue against this reading in §3 below.  
  See Bobonich 2002, 254, and Price 2009, 10.6
  Meditation Six, in Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch 1984, 2:59, rendering the text in Adam 7
and Tannery 1964-1976, 7:86. 
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below), even if that person's soul is tyrannically divided against itself (572b-580a, esp. 
577d13-e1).  Plato cannot mean that the complex of soul and body is the proper locus 
of responsibility, since the Myth of Er makes it clear that the disembodied soul in the 
afterlife is responsible for what it did while embodied (614b-616b).   (Besides, the soul is 8
supposed to be responsible for what the body does [353d].)  It might be tempting to 
make the rational part alone responsible, since Socrates suggests that only the rational 
part of the soul survives separation from the body (611b-612a)  and Er's myth says that 9
the soul in the afterlife bears responsibility for the person's past embodied existence 
(614b-616b) and for the next (617d-e).  But many actions for which an embodied human 
being is responsible are motivated by appetitive or spirited desire, and holding the 
rational part responsible for such actions seems to blame an innocent bystander or, 
worse, a victim.  So it is better to infer from Socrates' manner of speaking that the whole 
soul is responsible.  This can accommodate the hypothesis that only the rational part of 
the soul survives death. Plato could take the whole complex soul to be the locus of 
moral responsibility while it is embodied and the whole remaining (incomposite) soul to 
be the locus in the afterlife.  He would be justified in doing this because these are the 
same soul.  (In connection with the body, the soul develops parts that it lacks without a 
body [cf. 518d9-519a1], but it is nonetheless the same entity with or without the body.)  
He could elaborate this justification if (as I will suggest) what explains the complex unity 
of the embodied soul also explains how reason (and each of the other parts) is at least 
indirectly responsible for everything that any part of the embodied soul does.
There are, then, good reasons to take Socrates' talk of parts and wholes 
seriously and to seek an explanation of how the parts of every soul compose a single 
whole.  But these reasons are not necessarily conclusive.  First, if Plato's best account 
of unity does not attribute unity to every soul, one might take another approach to all 
  For the earned unity of the soul and body, see 462c-e.  Socrates does not discuss the unearned 8
unity of this complex, though this is surely relevant to the unity of consciousness (think of sense-
perception) and to moral responsibility.  
  Socrates is not fully committed to this suggestion (612a3-6), but he plainly considers it plausible. 9
See also 518d9-519a1, the Phaedo (esp. 78b-84b), and the Timaeus, but contrast the Phaedrus, 
contra Archer-Hind 1882, 127.
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this evidence.   One might, for example, say that Socrates speaks falsely of parts and 10
wholes and of single agents, for merely practical reasons.   Second, even if Plato can 11
account for unity in every soul, there might be evidence that calls into question Plato's 
commitment to the unearned unity of every soul.  So I aim to  show that Plato can 
account for the unity of every soul, and that there is no evidence undermining his 
account. 
There remain two other challenges to the claim that the soul's unearned unity is a 
significant puzzle.  One might think that Plato faces no real puzzle because he 
conceives of every soul as a simple unity, with merely conceptual parts, like subsets of 
psychological attitudes or "aspects" of a single entity.   Alternatively, one might think 12
that Socrates' way of dividing the soul simply rules out its unearned unity, so that his talk 
of a "whole" soul comprising "parts" and his endorsement of ordinary practices of praise 
and blame and of the unity of consciousness call for an error theory or a fresh start in 
another dialogue.   These views assume that if the Republic assigns three distinct 13
subjects to the soul, it cannot account for the soul's unity.  The first performs modus 
tollens with this conditional, the second modus ponens.  I reject the conditional itself.  
First, I show that according to Book Four's division of the soul, the soul's unearned unity 
must and can be complex.  Then I will identify a Platonic account of complex unity that 
explains why the whole soul is a locus of moral responsibility and at least enables 
explaining the unity of consciousness. 
  Cf. note 36 below, concerning Harte 2002.  10
  Cf. Kamtekar 2006, minus her insistence that Plato would not find protreptic value in a wholly 11
false account.  
  See, e.g., Shields 2001 and (though he does not go for this approach wholeheartedly) Price 2005 12
and 2009.  
  See Grote 1888, 2:386n ("three souls"); Adam 1905, ad 435a, qualified by the note ad 439b; and 13
Stalley 1975.  Bobonich (2002, 219-257) has recently argued forcefully for this conclusion, though 
he also allows himself to talk about the composite soul without explaining the composition or 
admitting that it offers any unity of the person.  His cogent denial (234 with 531n27) that there 
is any ultimate subject above and beyond the three parts of the soul does not exclude the 
possibility that the three parts might compose a unified subject. 
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3.  The problem of complex unity
The puzzle of how Plato might account for the unearned unity of the soul stems 
from Socrates' main argument to divide it.  Socrates introduces the argument by 
suggesting that there might be three different things in us "by which" we do three 
different kinds of things.  He says, 
But this is hard, [to determine] whether we do each of these things by this same 
thing or by three things, one thing by one and another by another.   Do we learn 
by one thing, get angry by another of the things in us, and again by a third desire 
the pleasures concerning nutrition and procreation and all the things akin to 
these, or do we act in each of these cases by the whole soul, whenever we 
should have an impulse to act?  This is hard to determine in a way worthy of our 
argument. (436a8-b4)  14
Socrates and Glaucon then agree to "try to determine the things in us, whether they are 
same as each other or different" (436b6-7). 
This opening raises the problem of the soul's unity without taking a stand.  It 
plainly introduces the possibility that there are three distinct sources of psychological 
states and activities in us.  Socrates is not merely categorizing the kinds of 
psychological states and activities; he has already done that easy task (435d-436a).  He 
now raises the hard question of whether we should attribute these different kinds to 
different causal sources in us.  This already tells against the suggestion that the soul 
has merely conceptual parts.  But it does not rule out the possibility that the distinct 
  Socrates says "in a way worthy of our argument" not to say that their standards are especially 14
high but to remind his interlocutors that they are not as high as they might be: they are not 
traveling the "longer road" that leads to a fuller answer by means of the Good (435c9-d3 with 
504b1-7).  Socrates continues to remind his interlocutors of these lower standards when he notes 
that the principle of non-opposition is merely a hypothesis in their current argument (437a3-8).  
I take these to be related because I assume that the Good is supposed to be the unhypothetical 
first principle (see 533a-534c with 505a, 506d-509d, and 509d-511d).  Hence, I take him to be 
saying that the longer argument would be required to render their conclusion in Book Four 
unhypothetical.  If that is right, Socrates does not suggest that the longer road would necessarily 
lead to a substantially different conclusion.   
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causal sources could compose a complex unity.   Socrates and Glaucon simply do not 15
consider the ramifications of there being different sources for learning, anger, and 
desires for bodily pleasures.  For all they say, the different sources might be parts of a 
single soul, as they are all sources "in us," or they might fail to be parts of a single soul, 
despite their being "in us." 
To answer his question, Socrates introduces the principle of non-opposition, a 
general principle applicable to any entity whatsoever:  "It is clear that the same thing will 
not be willing to do or undergo opposites [1] in the same respect [κατὰ ταὐτόν γε] and 
[2] in relation to the same thing [πρὸς ταὐτὸν] [3] at the same time [ἅμα]" (436b9-10).   16
He immediately draws out the consequence for the "things in us" that he has 
mentioned:  "The result is that if we should somehow discover these things [viz., 
opposites] happening in them [viz., the things in us by which we learn, feel anger, and 
desire the pleasures of nutrition and generation and such], we will know that they were 
not the same thing, but many."   Socrates continues to presuppose that either we act 17
by one thing or we act by many things.  So either he continues to set aside the 
ramifications of acting from multiple psychological sources—perhaps the multiple 
psychological sources are parts of a single soul and perhaps they are not—or he 
assumes without argument that the only way the soul can be unified is for its apparently 
  It might seem to.  Socrates contrasts acting by one of three psychological sources with acting "by 15
the whole soul [ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ]" (436b2).  But if this were the only way to understand the 
possibility of acting by the whole soul, then how would Socrates explain the implication of the 
whole passage (436a8-b4) that a single human agent acts whether this or that part of her soul is 
the source of the action?  We need to distinguish acting by the whole soul underivatively (which 
contrasts with acting with one of three psychological sources) and acting by the whole soul 
derivatively, insofar as one is acting by one of three psychological sources.  Socrates' question 
presupposes the first and ignores the second.  The implication of the whole passage, to which 
Socrates returns (439c3-8), requires the second.   
  Compare the principle of non-contradiction at Aristotle, Metaph. G3 1005b19-20.  16
  436b10-c2: …ὥστε ἄν που εὐρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν 17
ἀλλὰ πλείω.  My supplement takes αὐτοῖς to refer to the same things that the αὐτὰ of 436b6-7 
refer to, namely the things in us discussed in 436a8-b4.  Unfortunately, the Grube-Reeve 
translation (in Cooper 1997) is misleadingly careless here.  It reads, "So, if we ever find this 
happening in the soul, we'll know that we aren't dealing with one thing but many."  The careless 
"in the soul" for ἐν αὐτοῖς apparently leads to the complete fabrication of "we aren't dealing with 
one thing." 
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multiple sources of activity to be the same.  He has explicitly said nothing to shut the 
door on complex unity.    
But what has he implied?  The principle of non-opposition allows that a single 
subject can undergo opposites (call them φ and ψ) only when at least one of three 
conditions is met.  A single subject can φ at one time and ψ at another; a single subject 
can φ in relation to A and ψ in relation to B; and a single subject can φ in one respect 
and ψ in another.  But can a single subject φ by one part and ψ by another?  Or has 
Socrates already ruled this out?
According to what I will call the standard reading, a single subject can φ by one 
part and ψ by another, because to φ by one part and ψ by another just is to φ in one 
respect and ψ in another.   On this reading, the principle of non-opposition allows the 18
soul to be a whole that comprises parts that are distinct sources of psychological states 
and activities.  
Unfortunately, it is not hard to make trouble for the standard reading.   Socrates 19
immediately clarifies the principle of non-opposition by considering two potential 
counter-examples to it.  First, he says, 
If someone were to say of a human being who is standing still but moving his 
hands and head that one and the same person is standing still and moving at the 
same time, we would not, I think, think that we should say this, but rather that 
one thing of him is standing still and another [thing of him] is moving. (436c10-d1)
Socrates does not say that the single human being stands still in one respect (by some 
part of him) and move in another (by another part of him).  He insists, instead, that one 
thing stands still and another thing moves.  Nothing prevents his point from 
  See, for examples, Irwin 1995, 204; Price 1995, 40-41; and Shields 2001, 145.  The Grube-Reeve 18
translation (in Cooper 1997) unfortunately forces this reading on readers.  They render the 
principle of non-opposition's κατὰ ταὐτόν (436b9: "in the same respect") as "in the same part of 
itself," and they use the same rendering for κατὰ τὸ αὐτό at 436c6.
  I draw on Bobonich 2002 and Lorenz 2006 for the "trouble-making" reading.  Both believe that 19
Socrates establishes three distinct "ultimate" or "proper" subjects of psychological states and 
activities, though they disagree about the nature of the subjects, their oppositions, and the 
implications of the division. 
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generalizing.  If two parts of a single thing are subjects of opposites, the single thing 
does not undergo opposites in different respects; rather, a many undergoes opposites.  
This leaves unclear what it would mean to say that something φs in one respect 
and ψs in another.  If talk of different "respects" does not cover different parts, then what 
does it cover?  The trouble-makers take Socrates' treatment of the second potential 
counter-example to answer this question:
And if the person who says these things [about the man standing still and 
moving] became even more amusing and was sophisticated enough to say that 
whole spinning tops stand still and move at the same time when they have fixed 
their center in the same spot and revolve, or that anything else that stays in one 
spot while moving in a circle does the same thing, we would not agree, because 
such things belong to things that stand still and move not in the same respect of 
themselves.  Rather, we would say that they have an axis and a circumference in 
them and that with respect to the axis they stand still, since they do not incline to 
either side, while with respect to the circumference they move in a circle.  And 
whenever one does incline its axis to the left or the right, or to the front or back, 
while it is spinning, we would say that it is in no way standing still. (436d4-e5) 
This "sophisticated" counterexample is supposed to prevent Socrates from saying that 
some parts of the top move while others stand still.  The whole top is supposed to be 
moving and at rest (436d5).  Presumably, the whole top is moving insofar as it is 
revolving and at rest insofar as it does not incline now in this direction and now in that 
but continues to occupy the same volume of space (since the axis remains fixed).  
Socrates accordingly explains how this top does not violate the principle of non-
opposition by insisting that the top moves in one respect and stays at rest in another (cf. 
Laws 893c).   So understood, difference in respects is not the same as difference in 20
parts, and difference in parts is not one of the excusing conditions of the principle of 
non-opposition.
  See Stalley 1975, Bobonich 2002, 228-231, and Lorenz 2006, 23-24.  20
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Although this makes trouble for the standard reading, it does not establish that 
Socrates has ruled out the possibility that the soul is a complex unity.  In fact, he goes 
on to make room for something very close to the standard reading.  
To divide reason from appetite, Socrates restates the principle of non-opposition: 
Therefore, if sometime something draws the soul back when it is thirsting, 
wouldn't that be something in it that differs from the thing that thirsts and drives it 
like a beast to drink?  For, as we say, the same thing would not do opposites [1] 
by the same thing of itself [τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ] [2] about the same thing [περὶ τὸ 
αὐτὸ] [3] at the same time [ἅµα]. (439b3-6)
This restatement differs from the original in three ways.  The first is trivial:  this 
specification leaves out the possibility of "undergoing [πάσχειν]" opposites.  The second 
is potentially significant, but intelligible:  "in relation to the same thing [πρὸς ταὐτόν]" 
has become "about the same thing [περὶ τὸ αὐτό]," perhaps because Socrates 
assumes that mental experiences are related to other things specifically because they 
are about other things.  (Mental experiences, we might say, are characterized by 
intentionality.)  Third, in place of "in the same respect [κατὰ ταὐτόν]" Socrates has now 
said "by the same thing of itself [τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ]."  This is of some consequence.  
Recall the human who stands still while moving his arms and head:  "one thing of 
him is standing still and another [thing of him] is moving" (436d1).  According to the 
trouble-makers, because Socrates does not say that the human moves in one respect 
and stands still in another, the case does not satisfy any of the three excusing 
conditions of the principle of non-opposition.  It is not an allowable case of one thing 
being a subject of opposites but is instead a case of a plural subject.  But this case does 
satisfy one of the three excusing conditions of the restated principle of non-opposition.  
The restated principle allows a human to move "by one thing of him" and stand still "by 
another thing of him."
Why has Socrates restated the principle to such effect?  Perhaps the restated 
principle is just a more specific version of the original principle, tailored to the case of 
psychological conflict.  On this view, something close to the standard reading was right 
all along:  to φ with one part of oneself while ψing with another is one way of φing in one 
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respect and ψing in another.  (It is not the only way because the case of the top 
highlights another, though it might be the only way relevant to psychological conflict.)   21
So on this view, the trouble-makers misunderstood Socrates' characterization of the 
human who stands still and moves.  They took him to be saying only that one thing of 
him stands still and another moves, whereas he is also saying that the human moves in 
one respect and stands still in another.22
Or perhaps the trouble-makers were right about the original principle of non-
opposition and the human who stands still and moves, but they missed the way in which 
the restated principle of non-opposition blocks the trouble-making implication.  On this 
view, the original principle emphasizes the plurality required of an apparent subject of 
simultaneous opposites:  we should not say, strictly speaking, that the human moves in 
one respect and stands still in another.  But Plato does not mean to imply that the 
human body is not a whole comprising parts some of which can move while others are 
at rest.  The restated principle makes this explicit, since it allows us to say that the 
human moves by one part and stands still by another.  By putting the principle in both 
ways, Socrates emphasizes both the plurality and the unity of the human body and, by 
implication, the human soul.   23
  For an attempt to defend the standard reading more thoroughly by rejecting the Stalley-21
Bobonich-Lorenz  account of the spinning top, see Price 2009.  
  In support of this, one might make two points (cf. Price 2009).  First, one might point to the 22
question Socrates asks just before he raises the first potential counter-example (436c6-7): "Can 
the same thing stand still and move at the same time in the same respect?"  If this question 
focuses Glaucon's attention on ways in which a thing can simultaneously stand still and move in 
different respects, the two potential counter-examples could highlight two different ways in 
which a thing can stand still in one respect and move in another.  Second, one might question the 
trouble-makers' construal of 436d1.  It is possible to take the τὸ μέν and τὸ δέ to be accusatives of 
respect and not nominatives, in which case Socrates reports that "we should say… rather that he 
stands still in one respect and moves in another."  To reject this reading, Lorenz (2006, 23n9) 
appeals to the parallel case of the archer at 439b8-c1, where Socrates says that one hand moves 
one way and the other another, and not that archer moves one way with respect to one hand and 
another way with respect to the other.  But the archer enters after Socrates has restated the 
principle of non-opposition and traded the more general "in the same respect" clause for the more 
specific "by the same thing of itself" clause.  That would explain the general talk of respects for 
the human standing still and moving and the more specific talk of parts for archer.
  Adam (1905, ad 439b) allows only that by the restatement "Plato betrays a sense of the unity of 23
the soul."   Bobonich (2002, 232-233 with 530n22) goes so far as to deny that restatement differs 
significantly, by appealing unpersuasively to the position of γε in 439b5.  But Lorenz (2006, 27) 
appreciates the passage's significance.
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Whether the restated principle clarifies or substantially corrects the original, it 
explicitly allows the soul to be a single thing comprising multiple parts and not merely a 
many.  Thus, when Socrates answers his original question—does a person, a soul, do 
diverse activities by diverse elements of itself, or does she do each by the whole soul?
—he stresses that the diverse sources of an agent's actions are elements in or of a 
single soul.  He says that sometimes when "there are thirsty people who are unwilling to 
drink … there is something in their soul bidding them to drink, and there is something in 
[their soul], forbidding them to do so, something that is different and that overrides the 
thing that bids" (439c3-8).  He quickly labels "that by which the soul calculates the 
calculating thing of the soul and that by which it lusts, hungers, thirsts, and gets excited 
by other appetites the uncalculating and appetitive thing, companion of certain 
indulgences and pleasures" (439d4-8, translating d5-8).  Socrates takes himself to have 
shown not merely that there are multiple psychological sources within us but that "these 
two kinds are distinguished in the soul" (439e1-2).
This leaves our puzzle.   Although Socrates has left room for the soul to be a 24
complex whole comprising multiple parts, he has also made it clear that the parts are 
separate sources of psychological activity (appetite bids, reason forbids).  The rest of 
the Republic only makes this clearer, as each of the separate sources of psychological 
  Among others.  I set aside here the problems concerning how many parts Socrates' argument 24
establishes.  One of these problems concerns whether he is entitled to think that there is just one 
appetitive part: the heterogeneity of its desires suggests that there can be conflicting appetitive 
desires.  (Compare the strategies offered by Reeve 1988, 124-131; Irwin 1995, 203-217; Price 
1995, 46-48; and Lorenz 2006, 13-52.)  Another concerns whether he is entitled to think that 
there is a spirited part in addition to the appetitive and rational parts.  (See Cooper 1984.)  A 
third concerns whether there might not be some part(s) beyond reason, spirit, and appetite.  (See 
443e and Kamtekar 2008.)  My problem, concerning how the parts constitute a whole soul, 
applies however many parts there are and however they might be subdivided. 
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activity is characterized as agent-like.   What, then, explains how these separate 25
sources are parts of a single soul? 
3.  Failed explanations of the soul's unity
One might be tempted to say that nothing psychological explains the unity of a 
soul.  Only the brute fact of embodiment renders my rational, spirited, and appetitive 
elements parts of me and leaves your psychological elements out.  One might offer two 
reasons for this suggestion.  First, the soul is supposed to explain the distinction 
between a living and dead body (353d9-10).  The explananda are the vital activities of a 
living body.  That body's soul is the explanans.  But if we are dealing with just one living 
body, we should be dealing with just one soul to explain it.  Second, if the soul by itself 
is a simple unity whose embodied complexity is due to embodiment (611a-612a with 
518d-e), the embodied soul's complex unity might be best explained not by the soul 
  This has been widely recognized, at least since Moline 1978, although there are debates about 25
exactly what characteristics should be imputed to the different parts, and especially appetite (cf. 
Bobonich 2002, Lorenz 2006, and Moss 2008).  Anyone who takes the parts of the soul to be 
merely conceptual must somehow explain away Socrates' descriptions of the soul-parts as 
distinct agent-like subjects of psychological states and activities.  But there are good reasons to 
take these seriously (see Kamtekar 2006).  Four reasons to deflate them are unconvincing.  First, 
Price (2009, 10) argues that if the parts are distinct subjects, Plato cannot account for the unity 
of consciousness (what Price calls "co-consciousness").  But this is prematurely pessimistic.  Next, 
Shields (2001) argues that if soul-parts were more than conceptual, then the soul could not be 
essentially simple and thus could not be immortal.  But in Republic X (611b-612a), Plato 
entertains the possibility of a complex soul being immortal and the possibility of the same soul 
being simple when disembodied and being necessarily complex when embodied (see also n. 26). 
Shields (2001, 147-148) also argues that because the principle of non-opposition can establish a 
distinction among conceptual parts, it cannot establish organic or aggregative parts.  But this 
does not follow.  The principle establishes multiplicity without characterizing the multiple 
entities or their relation to each other.  Finally, Shields (2001, 148-151) argues that Socrates 
does not establish that the soul is essentially a complex unity since the true nature of the soul 
might not be multiform (611b-612a) and since the Book Four argument in any case uses a 
contingent a posteriori premise ("Our souls sometimes both have an appetite to drink and refuse 
to drink" [439c1-2]).  But Socrates does not need to show that the soul is essentially multiform; 
he can and does allow that the disembodied soul might be simple.  He does mean to show that 
the embodied soul is necessarily multiform—notice the definitions of the virtues in terms of the 
distinct parts of the soul, though virtues are found in people free of internal conflict—but the a 
posteriori premise can and should be construed as the existence proof for the modal premise 
Socrates needs, which is that every embodied soul can experience conflict (cf. Bobonich 2002, 
235).  
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itself, since the soul explains simple, disembodied unity, but by precisely what makes it 
complex, the body.  
These reasons are not convincing.  The first gives at best a reason why we 
should want an account of the soul's unity; it does not actually give that account.  The 
second is perhaps unduly speculative, since Socrates in Book Ten pulls up short of 
saying that the disembodied soul is partless (612a3-6).   But more importantly, the 26
basic claim that the soul's unity is due to the body flouts two basic and widely attested 
Platonic commitments.  First, it flouts the Platonic dictum that the soul rules the body.   27
It also makes the soul's unearned unity an extrinsic property, dependent upon 
something external to the soul, though Plato's dialogues invariably treat unity as an 
intrinsic property.   In the Republic, Socrates says that the just person 28
puts himself in order, is his own friend, and harmonizes the three parts of himself 
like three limiting notes in a musical scale—high, low, and middle.  He binds 
together those parts and any others there may be in between, and becomes 
entirely one thing out of many, moderate and harmonious. (443d5-e2)
This unity is internal harmony, and by calling the unified soul moderate, Socrates means 
that psychic unity, just like the unity of the city (cf. 462b-e), is defined by internal 
agreement (442c9-d2, cf. 432a6-b1).  This is the earned unity of the virtuous few, and 
not the unearned unity we are looking for.  But this specification nevertheless casts 
doubt on taking unearned unity to be an extrinsic property. 
At this point, one might try a different tack.  If the human soul contains three 
distinct sources of psychological states and activities but is nevertheless a morally 
  Before and after 611a-612a in Book Ten, he gives no support to the idea: his argument for 26
immortality assumes nothing about the simplicity of the soul, unlike the so-called "Affinity 
Argument" in Phaedo 78b-84b (see Brown 1997, and contrast Shields 2001, 143-144) and some of 
what Er says is more readily intelligible if disembodied souls retain spirited and appetitive 
elements in them.  Moreover, for what it is worth, the Timaeus and Phaedrus suggest divergent 
answers to the question of whether the disembodied soul is complex or simple.  So no matter how 
suggestive 611a-612a might be, it is difficult to be confident that Plato held a settled view on the 
question.  
  See 353d with Phaedo 80a and 94b-e, Alcibiades 130a, and Philebus 35d.  Cf. Aristotle, De an. I 5 27
411b5-9.  
  I here concentrate on the Republic and in the next section draw help from the Phaedrus and 28
Gorgias.  For evidence in the Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus, see Harte 2002.  
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responsible agent, perhaps it is quite literally a "plural subject" or corporate agent.  On 
this view, the psychological unity that belongs to a human being is nothing more and 
nothing less than what belongs to a group such as a Parent-Teacher Organization, and 
the practice of holding a human being morally responsible is akin to recognizing 
collective responsibility. 
This approach needs an account of collective agency.  What makes a collection a 
plural subject and thus a single agent?  One popular answer is that multiple agents 
become a plural subject by sharing an intention.   This can work for all sorts of plural 29
subjects, and it can even explain how a plural subject becomes a kind of unity.   30
Moreover, it would seem to fit well the Republic's insistence that earned unity is a matter 
of agreement among the parts of the soul.  But there is some reason for doubt.  Given 
the different aims that Socrates attributes to the three parts of the soul, it seems 
plausible that some vicious people will have psychological elements that fail to share 
intentions.  What would explain the unity of such a soul, and thus how it is the locus of 
moral responsibility?  Well, perhaps a group can be a plural subject by sharing an 
intention that its members do not all recognize, because the relationships within the 
group give all its members intentions whether they recognize them or not.   Perhaps 31
the psychological elements in even a deeply conflicted soul share intentions in this way.  
This resembles Plato's account in some important ways.  The unearned unity of 
the soul is, like earned unity, a function of agreement among its parts, but unearned 
unity does not require each part of the soul to recognize the aims that it shares with the 
other parts.  So the moral responsibility of the whole soul is akin to the collective 
responsibility of a corporate agent.  But Plato does not take the soul to be merely a 
corporate agent.  For one thing, at least some corporate agents are formed and 
dissolved voluntarily, by convention, whereas the human soul is a natural composite (cf. 
588d5-6).  There are natural relations among the soul's parts that secure the unity of the 
soul.  This is a good thing, since Plato needs more than a plural subject if his account is 
  See, e.g., Gilbert 1989 and 2000.  29
  See, e.g., Velleman 1997.  30
  Cf. May 1987 and 1992.  31
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supposed even potentially to explain the coordinated source of all vital activities and 
especially the unity of consciousness.  To grasp Plato's account of natural unity, we 
need a fresh start. 
4.  A fresh approach to unity
In the Phaedrus,  Socrates tries to lead young Phaedrus to take up the genuine 32
art of oratory and to reject what ordinarily passes as that art.  Among other things, he 
claims that ordinary teachers of oratory give insufficient attention to how an expert 
speaker fashions his speech into a whole (269c1-5).  To motivate this claim, he appeals 
to the difficulty of crafting a tragedy, and Phaedrus readily sees that a tragedy must be a 
"system" whose elements fit with one another and with the whole (268d3-5).  Socrates 
says, "Every speech, since it has a body of its own, must be composed like a living 
being, so that it is neither headless nor footless but instead has things in the middle and 
at the extremities which are written to fit each other and the whole" (264c2-5).  On this 
account, something is made a whole by the special arrangement of its parts.33
Although the Phaedrus applies this account only to speeches, tragedies, and 
living bodies, the Gorgias encourages further generalization.   There Socrates 34
maintains that every craft, and not just tragedy and oratory, confers special organization 
to its products (503d-504e, cf. 506c-508a), and he suggests that the same kind of order 
or organization is manifest in the natural world (507e-508a).  In the Gorgias, he does 
not talk of unity or wholeness exactly, but the language he does use (of order [κόσμος] 
and organization [τάξις]) perfectly fits what he says in the Phaedrus about what makes 
elements into parts of a whole.   Encouraged by the Gorgias, I attribute to Plato this 35
perfectly general account of complex unities (wholes):  diverse elements constitute a 
  I cite the text in Burnet 1901, and translations are mine.  32
  One might want to insist, more precisely, that something is made a whole by the arrangement of 33
things that are, because of the arrangement, its parts.  I forgo such precision here.
  Text: Dodds 1959.34
  As Dodds (1959, ad 504a1) sees.  35
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complex unity, a whole, if and only if they are suitably organized in relation to each other 
and in relation to the whole that they constitute.
But what makes diverse elements suitably organized in relation to each other and 
in relation to the whole that they constitute, as opposed to being organized in some 
unsuitable way?  In the Phaedrus, Socrates maintains that if the elements of a speech 
are not organized well, then the speech not only fails to constitute a whole, its speaker 
fails "to speak these elements persuasively" (269c2-3).  That is to say, since oratory is 
the art of leading souls through speech (261a7-8, cf. 271c10), a speech without good 
organization fails to perform its function well.  This explanation also generalizes well to 
other artifacts and living bodies.  A shipbuilder's product, if it is not a whole of suitably 
ordered parts, will fail to be seaworthy.  A living body, if it is not a whole of suitably 
ordered parts, will fail to be able to perform its vital activities.  
Plainly, there are degrees of organization and degrees of success here.  A 
speech (or ship or living body) need not be perfectly organized to be persuasive 
(seaworthy, vitally active), but the best speeches (ships, living bodies) will be more 
persuasive (seaworthy, good at vital activities) by displaying greater organization than 
lesser ones.  Still, in every case, the range of permissible organization has a lower limit.  
Below this limit, there is nothing performing the function of the relevant kind, and so 
nothing of the relevant kind at all:  sometimes we have a heap of potential ship-parts but 
not a ship, a string of words but not a speech, or an assortment of limbs but not a living 
body.  
In sum, then, the Phaedrus, with help from the Gorgias, suggests that diverse 
elements are parts of a whole if and only if they are organized in relation to each other 
and to the whole in such a way that the whole is able to perform its function.  Unity is a 
function of organization, because a complex thing's ability to do what it does depends 
upon its parts' ability to do what they do, which in turn depends upon their orderly 
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relations (since no part could do what it does as a part independent of the other parts 
and the whole).  36
5.  Explaining the soul's unity
By now, my hypothesis should be obvious:  I suggest that Plato treats the human 
soul like a speech, a ship, or a living body.  The soul's unity is a function of the order or 
harmony of its parts.  The parts' causal relations with each other produce this order or 
harmony:  the more the parts do what they are supposed to do, as parts, the more the 
soul enjoys unity.  On this view, Socrates can and does say that the soul's unity takes 
the specific form of agreement, since agreement is the harmony or order of minded 
things.  And on this view, the soul can perform vital activities—that is, its function of 
living—with only some minimal agreement and order, since it requires perfect 
agreement and order only for excellent or virtuous activities.  (That is the distinction 
between unearned and earned unity.)  
In the Republic, Socrates does not make this account fully explicit.  He does 
explicitly characterize the just person's maximal unity as a kind of harmony and 
agreement (462d5-e2, quoted and discussed above), and with his account of justice, he 
makes clear that the parts produce this harmony by doing what they are supposed to 
do.  But he only hints at how to extend this account of unity to less than perfectly just 
souls.  First, he explains to Glaucon, 
For the sake of a model we were seeking both what sort of thing justice itself is 
and what sort of man the completely just man would be if he came into being, 
  Harte (2002) finds in Plato's Sophist, Timaeus, and (especially) Philebus a broadly similar 36
account of wholes in terms of the structure or harmony of parts.  The account she finds, however, 
does not welcome degrees of structure and wholeness or unity.  If the Republic offered the same 
account (and see §6 for this), earned unity would be the only kind of unity that souls could enjoy, 
and in fact, any talk of the whole soul would be merely an unjustified manner of speaking except 
when we were speaking of the virtuous.  But Plato has good reasons for wanting the soul to have 
unearned unity (see §2 above) and Socrates speaks as though it does (see §1 and §3).  Moreover, 
what Socrates says in the Republic about the soul's order and functioning fits the general 
account of the Phaedrus and Gorgias, according to which unity comes in degrees.  If my account 
is right, then Harte's is wrong; Plato changed his mind after writing the Republic; or Plato has 
two distinct accounts, one (admitting degrees) for things subject to becoming and another (not 
admitting degrees) for abstract objects.
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and likewise injustice and the most unjust man, in order that, by looking at them 
and how they seemed to us concerning happiness and its opposite, we would 
have to agree about ourselves as well, that the one who was most like them 
would have a portion of happiness most like theirs. (Rep. 472c4-d1)
Here Socrates says that the imperfect soul lives more or less well (has a greater or 
lesser "portion of happiness") according to how closely its order approximates the just 
soul's.  He elaborates in Book Nine, arguing that the perfectly just soul lives best (is 
most happy) and other souls live more or less well (are more or less happy) according 
to how closely their order approximates the just soul's (580a-c).  Socrates assumes both 
that there is a correlation between psychological order (that is, justice) and 
psychological functioning (that is, living) and that each of these features comes in 
degrees. 
These assumptions do not commit Socrates to the thought that imperfect souls 
enjoy unearned unity.  But he also suggests in Book One that a soul needs some 
minimal justice if it is to perform its function.  After arguing that a city or a band of 
thieves would be unable to achieve an unjust purpose if its members were unjust toward 
each other (351d), he generalizes the point thus:  because injustice sows internal 
disharmony, it threatens to render "a city, a family, an army, or anything else," including 
a soul (cf. 352a6-7), "unable to do anything with itself" (351e10-352a3).  
Moreover, Socrates offers two causal principles about the interaction of the soul's 
parts that illuminate the structural order that makes the three psychological elements 
parts of a whole.  The first can be called Plato's hydraulic principle of psychology.  
Socrates says, "When someone's desires incline strongly for one thing, they are thereby 
weakened for others, just like a stream that has been partly diverted into another 
channel" (485d6-8; cf. 328d3-5).  This plainly applies to different soul-parts within the 
same soul.  If my spirited desires grow stronger, my rational and appetitive ones grow 
weaker.  Just as plainly, the principle cannot apply to psychological elements in different 
people:  if your spirited desires grow, nothing automatically follows for my rational and 
appetitive desires.  (Of course, you might influence me, and if my spirited desires were 
to strengthen, too, then my rational and appetitive desires would weaken.  But this is a 
rather different story.)
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The second I will call Plato's principle of psychological hegemony.  In Books 
Eight and Nine, Socrates maintains that different kinds of people are ruled by different 
soul-parts.  As he explains this, to be ruled by a soul-part is to take the ends of that 
soul-part to be one's ends, generally.   If I am ruled by spirited desire, I take my good 37
to be honor or victory, the ends of the spirited part.  If I am ruled by appetitive desire, I 
take my good to be bodily pleasure or, perhaps, if I calculate a bit, the best means to 
achieve bodily pleasure, which is money.  This pattern requires certain causal 
interactions within the soul.  Because the spirited or appetitive part of the soul gets more 
powerful, the rational part, which alone calculates what is good for the whole soul 
(441e3-4, 442c4-7), begins to calculate that it would be good to achieve what the 
powerful part wants.  When a young man is influenced by his father to pursue wisdom 
and by everyone else to pursue money and publicly contested honors, he calculates 
that his good lies in the middle way, pursuing the spirited part's end of honor 
(549c-550b).  When another young man sees his honor-loving father killed or reduced 
to poverty, he calculates that it would be safer to pursue money, the end of the 
appetitive part (553a-d).
This principle explains what it is for a soul to be ruled by some part of the soul by 
explaining what it is for the rational part of the soul to be ruled.  Corollaries to the 
principle explain what it is for the spirited or appetitive part to be ruled.  When spirit is 
ruled by either reason or appetite, the spirited part finds honor in the ends of the ruling 
part.  When appetite is successfully ruled by either reason or spirit, it limits its pleasures 
to those deemed good by ruling reason or honorable by ruling spirit (and thus good by 
ruled reason).    
Again, the principle of psychological hegemony and its corollaries explain direct 
connections in me without imputing direct connections between your spirited element 
and me.  That your spirited element has grown so strong as to dominate your soul does 
not force my rational part to determine that honor or victory are my good (or yours).  
Again, you might influence me.  If my spirited desires were to strengthen, too, then I 
  The evidence for this principle is diffuse; it emerges as the best explanation of what Socrates 37
says in Books Eight and Nine about what it is for one part of the soul to rule.
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would calculate that honor or victory is good for me (cf. 549c-550b).  But that is not the 
direct causal influence that my soul-parts enjoy over each other.    
 The two causal principles are related.  For instance, a rational part can come to 
accept that honor or victory is what is good only if it is too weak to grasp what really is 
good, but it will be too weak if the spirit has taken much of the soul's "hydraulic power" 
away from reason. 
 Also, these are not the only causal principles Plato would invoke to explain 
psychological behavior.  Among others, Plato clearly believes that the appetitive part 
has its own internal tendency to grow stronger, which requires that it be checked at 
every turn (442a).  Socrates paints this principle into his imaginative portrait of the soul 
at the end of Book Nine, when he says that the just person must continually prevent the 
many-headed beast of appetite from sprouting savage heads (589a-b; cf. 571b-572b).  
He also assumes it when he asserts that gold and silver need to be kept away from 
guardians (416e-417a) and when he predicts that a person with a timocratic soul will 
become progressively more money-loving over the course of his lifetime (549a-b).  So 
there are causal tendencies in the soul that encourage it to become less orderly and 
unified.
Still, the hydraulic principle of psychology and the principle of psychological 
hegemony explain how the soul tends to organize and unify itself, even when its 
appetite grows.  Even in these circumstances, there is a tendency for the rational part to 
agree with appetite about what is good and a tendency for the spirited part to find some 
honor in what appetite pursues.  This tendency is a product of the causal relations 
among my soul-parts and does not extend to yours, which captures the sense in which 
my soul-parts are parts of one psychological system, one soul.  They are parts of one 
soul because they are parts of an orderly causal structure that manifests itself in every 
soul as a tendency toward agreement, a tendency reaches perfect fulfillment in only 
some souls.  The minimal structure is required for living, its perfect fulfillment for living 
well.  But not even the most corrupt dissolves to the point of inactivity.  38
  Cf. 608c-611a with Brown 1997.38
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This account of psychic unity shares some features with accounts of collective 
agency.  Just as some human beings might share aims due to the way they relate to 
each other in a group—even if they do not realize that they share these aims, or 
converge on some mistaken view about them—so, too, the soul's parts share aims 
though they do not realize it or converge on a mistaken view about them.  This parallel 
helps to explain how the whole soul can be held responsible for whatever any part of it 
does.  When one part of the soul does something, the others are causally implicated in 
a structure that fosters agreement.  At the least, each of the others could have been a 
more powerful obstacle.  So it would not be inappropriate to hold the rational part alone 
responsible in the afterlife for what the other parts had done during embodied life.
Unlike collective agency, though, psychic unity on this account depends upon a 
purely natural structure of causal relations (cf. 588d5-6).  Given the way the soul and 
body naturally are, the embodied soul comprises parts that causally relate to each other 
in ways that tend toward agreement.  These parts are distinct subjects, but the account 
presupposes that they are not distinct in exactly the same way that two human beings 
are distinct subjects.  It presupposes that soul-parts naturally share information 
intimately, though it does not explain exactly how or how much information is shared.  It 
also presupposes that at least much of the shared information manifests itself to the 
soul as a single consciousness, and again, we might ask questions about exactly how 
this is supposed to work.  The Republic does not address those questions, but it does 
not render them unanswerable, either.      39
6.  Sustaining this explanation of the soul's unity
This account of the soul's unearned unity is incomplete.  Most obviously, it lacks 
a precise notion of internal agreement.  This calls for some reckoning of the mental 
content of the various soul-parts, to see how there could be shared content.  This would 
give additional flesh to the account of psychic unity and perhaps explain the unity of 
  Related questions face current philosophers who suppose that modularity is essential to 39
explaining the mind-brain (e.g., Fodor 1983). 
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consciousness.  But for now, the skeleton of the account needs further defense, and I 
close by addressing suggestions that some souls lack unity.
The first depends upon the city-soul analogy.  Socrates tells Adeimantus, 
You are happily innocent if you think that anything other than the kind of city we 
are founding deserves to be called a city … We need a bigger category to 
address the others because each of them is a great many cities, not a city … At 
any rate, each of them consists of two cities at war with one another, that of the 
poor and that of the rich, and each of these contains a great many. (Rep. 
422e1-423a2) 
Now, if none but the ideal city is really a city, because every other claimant fails to be a 
unity, then the analogy of city and soul suggests that none but the ideal soul is really a 
soul, because every other claimant fails to be a unity.   40
But the analogy of city and soul can only suggest; it cannot prove.  There is an 
open question about which features of cities have analogues in souls and vice versa, 
and so it is easy enough to suppose that this particular feature of cities does not have 
an analogue in souls.  Moreover, we can justify this supposition.  First, cities do not 
seem to have the same causal regularities governing the interaction of their parts that 
souls do.  In particular, the principle of psychological hegemony has no analogue for the 
city:  that the oligarchs rule does not tend to make the democrats accept the oligarchs' 
rule.  This is not to say that there is no tendency toward shared values in a city:  Plato 
plainly recognizes the power of a shared culture to shape the citizens' values.   But 41
shared values do not necessarily produce agreement about who should rule in the city 
as it does in the soul.  Agreement in values just is agreement about who should rule in 
  One might doubt that Socrates is entirely serious here.  In Book One, he urges that even a band 40
of thieves must have some justice to achieve its purpose (351c-d), which reinforces the idea that 
justice comes in degrees and encourages the thought that even an imperfectly functioning 
community has enough justice to be a community.  I am nevertheless inclined to think that 
Socrates is seriously reserving 'polis' for the most successful communities (cf. Pol. 293e).  
Perhaps the ensuing discussion above helps to explain why he does this: he might be worried 
that attributing goodness to every community undercuts the goodness that he wants to predicate 
of only the best communities.  Alternatively, his reasons might run deeper: perhaps the causal 
relations among human beings, unlike those among the parts of the soul, do not underwrite 
unearned unity.  I thank Anton Ford and Clerk Shaw for discussion of this point.  
  See Lear 1992 and Burnyeat 1999.  41
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the soul.  In the city, by contrast, the oligarchs and democrats can agree broadly in their 
values but disagree about whether the rich alone should rule.  Second, competing 
factions in a city do not share responsibility for "what the city does" as parts of a divided 
soul do.  That is why Socrates insists that when Kallipolis is at war with another Greek 
city, the Kallipolitans will not ravage the entire enemy city but will target the real 
enemies in the city who are responsible for the war (471a-b).   These differences 42
between cities and souls explain why it is reasonable to say that a divided city is not a 
whole city but not to say that a divided soul is not a whole soul.
But this might seem to prove too much.  In Book Eight, Socrates returns to his 
point about divided cities, and he extends his analysis to divided souls.  Having said an 
oligarchic city is "not one but two, one of the poor and one of the rich" (551d5), he 
claims of an oligarchic soul, "Such a person would turn out not to be free of civil strife in 
himself, and he would be not one but in a way twofold [διπλοῦς τις], but for the most part 
he would have better desires in control of worse" (554d9-e2).  This is the strongest 
evidence that Socrates is willing to deny unearned unity to a human soul.  But it shows, 
in fact, that Socrates is not willing.  In the case of divided cities he says forthrightly that 
they are two (δύο, 422e6 and 551d5), but of the soul he says only that it is "in a way 
twofold" (διπλοῦς τις, 551e1).  The hedge is significant, and well explained by the fact 
that even the "in a way twofold" soul has parts that are causally related so as to 
promote agreement.  Socrates says explicitly that such a soul "for the most part would 
have better desires in control of worse," and presumably, if the better desires were to 
lose control of the worse, then the soul would tend away from oligarchy and towards 
democracy by jettisoning the distinction between better and worse appetitive desires 
and treating all equally.  The causal tendencies are enough to establish that the 
oligarchic soul is a single soul.  
  Cf. Thucydides' presentation of the Mytilenian debate.  The Athenians come to undertand that 42
the democrats in Mytilene were not responsible for the revolt, because that revolt was led by the 
oligarchic faction and stopped by the democrats themselves (esp. 3.47.3).  It is true that the 
Athenians come to see this belatedly (3.36) and only by a slight majority (3.49.1).  But this is not 
because the point is reasonably contested: at least, Thucydides suggests that passionate rage has 
blinded those who want to punish the Mytilenian democrats (3.36.2, 3.44.4).  
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Socrates' point in this passage is not that the oligarchic person has more than 
one soul.  His point is that the oligarchic person's soul falls far short of the unity that 
virtue earns.  He makes this sort of point often in the Republic, as he is keen to 
convince his interlocutors that people who do not pursue wisdom suffer psychologically 
in ways that philosophers do not.  But this point deprecates the earned unity of non-
philosophical souls, not their unearned unity.   Even the most divided soul is still a 43
single soul whose unity is explicable in terms of a structure of parts causally related so 
as to tend to agreement.
 
  Recall 608c-611a with Brown 1997.  One might say that Socrates' point deprecates their "ethical" 43
unity, not their "metaphysical" unity, but this is misleading.  There is just one kind of unity.  
Every embodied soul possesses it at least to the minimal extent that a complex entity needs to 
exist, though only some souls possess it maximally. 
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